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Where Can Capabilities Come From? 
 








While strategy researchers have devoted considerable attention to the role of 
firm-specific capabilities in the pursuit of competitive advantage, less attention has been 
directed at how firms obtain these capabilities from outside a firm’s boundaries. This 
study analyzes how firms’ network ties represent one important source of capability 
acquisition. Theoretically, we go beyond the traditional focus on network structure and 
offer a novel contingency model that specifies how differences in the content of network 
ties (e.g., buyer-supplier, equity, and director ties) will differentially affect the process of 
R&D capability acquisition. Empirically, we also seek to provide an original contribution 
to the capabilities literature by utilizing a stochastic frontier estimation to rigorously 
measure firm capabilities, and we demonstrate the value of this approach using 
longitudinal data on business groups in emerging economies. The supportive results of 
our analysis show that the effect of network ties on the acquisition of new affiliate 
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Growing recognition of the criticality of organizational capabilities to the pursuit 
of competitive advantage (Nelson, 1991; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) has raised at 
least two important questions for strategy research:    how do firms differ in their 
capabilities, and where do these differences originate?    Prior research has examined 
internal sources of firm capabilities such as skills and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
as well as externally derived capabilities obtained through formal and informal 
relationships with other firms (Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000). The focus of this latter 
stream of work has primarily been on how the structural attributes of network ties affects 
the acquisition of capabilities.    However, findings in this area are not convergent:   
some research has found that networks rich in structural holes are conducive to the 
capability building of firms embedded in the networks (Burt, 1992; McEvily and Zaheer, 
1999), while others contend that more dense networks would promote capability building 
by facilitating internal coordination and recombination (Coleman, 1990; Ahuja, 2000).   
We suggest that a possible explanation of these divergent findings on the network 
ties-to-capabilities relationship may reside in the relative overemphasis on network 
structure relative to an emphasis on the content transmitted through different types of 
network ties. Content here refers to the material and immaterial substance conveyed 
through a tie (Podolny and Baron, 1997). It also refers to the behaviors and interactions 
between firms that characterize the nature of the inter-firm relationship (Gulati and 
Westphal, 1999). In this study, rather than viewing network ties as generic conduits for 
information and resource exchange between firms, we suggest instead that different types 
of ties (offering different content) will have differential effects on a firm’s acquisition of 
capabilities through network ties (see also McEvily and Marcus, 2005).     
In developing this line of argument, we offer a contingency model that specifies 
whether and how different types of network ties with distinctly different content can 
influence capability building of firms. We situate our theoretical arguments using 
business groups in emerging economies. These business groups, defined as coherent 
business organizations composed of formally independent firms under a common 
administrative and financial control (Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), 
are networks in which the behavior and the performance of individual affiliates are   4
intertwined through various formal and informal relationships within the group 
(Granovetter, 1995). To the extent that affiliated firms presumably benefit from access to 
complementary resources, economies of scope and scale, shared costs and risks, and 
market access to distribution channels, one might expect that affiliates in the same 
business group would exhibit similar capabilities and performance. However, studies 
have shown that there is substantial variation in capabilities and performance of the 
individual affiliates within a specific business group, with some member businesses 
operating at the leading edge of productivity and others lagging their affiliates (e.g. 
Chang, 2003). Thus, business groups offer a desirable empirical context in which to 
address the existence of differences in the capabilities of individual affiliates in a group 
(after controlling for the effect of an affiliate’s internal resources).   
As implied from the discussion above, our analysis will focus on the role of the 
intra-group social network to explain variation in affiliates’ capabilities.  We  consider 
three types of inter-firm ties prevalent in business groups: buyer-supplier ties, equity ties, 
and director ties, and we propose that the diverse content found in different types of ties 
gives affiliates differential opportunities to acquire capabilities from their networks. 
Rather than aggregating across these different types of ties, we first disaggregate and 
posit the likely differential influence of each type of ties on the acquisition of capabilities.   
In terms of the capabilities themselves, our primary focus is on examining how 
group affiliated firms enhance their R&D capability by advantageously utilizing different 
types of network ties that can offer different tie content. Our focus on R&D capabilities 
seems sensible insofar as business groups have often been characterized as important 
technology importers and creators in many emerging economies (Amsden and Hikino, 
1994; Chang, Chung and Mahmood, 2006). By analyzing on the role of varied 
intra-group network ties as conduits for information and resources, we seek to shed 
additional light on how firms in emerging economies develop their R&D capability.   
Finally, we seek to contribute to the capabilities literature through our empirical 
methodology, as well. Clearly, there are several ways to conceptualize firm capability 
(Ethiraj, et al., 2005), but there remains a challenging empirical issue as to how to 
measure capability.    In this study, we measure firm capabilities using a novel 
econometric approach called the stochastic frontier estimation (SFE). Following SFE, we   5
view capabilities as the technical efficiency with which a firm employs a given set of 
resources or inputs at its disposal to achieve certain outputs (Dutta, Narasimhan, and 
Rajiv, 2005). While the use of the input-output approach to capability is relatively new in 
strategic management research, this approach to operationalizing firm capability captures 
the notion of capability as the ability of a firm to combine efficiently a number of 
resources to attain a certain goal (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Majumdar, 1998). This 
approach is also consistent with the extant view of capabilities as intermediate goods 
aimed at improving the productivity of resources possessed by the firm (Makadok, 2001). 
Our empirical analysis is conducted using an extensive longitudinal dataset 
involving 101 cases of affiliates belonging to 48 unique business groups in Taiwan 
between 1990 and 1998. The results of our analysis are largely supportive of our 
hypotheses:    the effect of network ties on the acquisition of new affiliate capabilities is 
clearly and predictably contingent on the content of the ties.   
 
A CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVE ON NETWORK TIE CONTENT 
 
Our theoretical contribution builds logically on the dual literatures on firm 
capabilities and social networks, and we address both literatures in this section. We begin 
by noting that while there is strong agreement among strategy scholars that a firm with 
superior capabilities enjoys a competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993; Teece and Pisano, 
1994); there is weaker agreement or understanding as to how such capabilities originate. 
According to Amit and Schoemaker (1993), capabilities represent the ability of firms to 
deploy resources to attain a desired goal using organizational processes. The 
enhancement of capabilities needs continuous investment in organizational systems 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002).   
Before presenting our contingency argument, we first address prior arguments 
regarding the role of network ties in capability building.    Interorganizational ties are 
often seen as facilitating the development of R&D capability, which requires access to 
resources and assimilation of externally acquired knowledge. As an example, consider all 
the affiliates of Samsung Group in Korea, which can obtain timely and sufficient 
financial support for their R&D projects, ensuring their ability to be at technological   6
frontier (Chang, 2003). The inter-organizational learning and knowledge transfer in joint 
ventures and strategic alliances exemplify the importance of network ties in the 
acquisition of R&D capability (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Prior network 
research has also shown that network ties may obstruct, rather than facilitate, the 
development of firm capabilities. For example, while firms may develop popular new 
products when networks provide it with access to complementary resources and 
information on customers’ needs (Srinivasan, Lovejoy, and Beach, 1997), excessive 
inter-organizational ties can also interfere with the development of firm capabilities by 
promoting insularity and information leakage (Uzzi, 1997; Burt, 2000).    In any event, a 
substantial number of research studies have focused on how the extent that a firm is 
embedded in a network of formal and informal ties (i.e., a key aspect of network structure) 
will influence its capabilities.   
In contrast, relatively little is known about the effect of tie content.  Network  ties 
are clearly heterogeneous in their content, and key differences in content among types of 
ties can influence the types of resources and information exchanged. A few studies have 
addressed this issue in different context.    For example, Gulati and Westphal (1999) find 
that the content of CEO-board relationships affects the formation of alliances by 
influencing the trust between corporate leaders, and McEvily and Marcus (2005) show 
that joint problem-solving ties with suppliers (but not ties with customers) are strongly 
related to the acquisition of capabilities. This suggests the importance of identifying the 
content transmitted through each type of ties to further improve our understanding of the 
role of networks in the process of capability building (Ahuja, 2000; Gnyawali and 
Madhavan, 2001; Zaheer and Bell, 2005).     
We address this need in the present study by analyzing how the different types of 
network ties (which imply different resource flows) will affect the acquisition of firm 
capabilities, and furthermore, we explicitly elaborate the mechanisms by which the 
content of network ties may influence capability building. To contextualize our 
discussion, we consider how these issues materialize in business groups in emerging 
economies.   
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BUSINESS GROUPS AS NETWORKS 
 
Business groups are a common type of multi-business firm in developing 
economies, frequently dominating a substantial fraction of a country’s productive assets 
and influencing their countries' technological development (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; 
Granovetter, 1995). Although their precise definitions vary across countries, groups 
combine elements of conglomerate holding companies and multidivisional corporations, 
creating a type of multi-business firm that some theorists refer to as a network form of 
organization (Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Podolny and Page, 1998).   
Group affiliates coordinate business activities with each other, but also are 
responsible to their own governance bodies including shareholders, directors, and 
auditors. Like conglomerates, a group provides a corporate financial structure that 
controls businesses in multiple industries (Williamson, 1985). Like multidivisional 
corporations, meanwhile, businesses within a group operate with a substantial degree of 
interdependence (Chandler, 1997). Yet groups also differ from conglomerate and 
multidivisional corporations. Groups are more stable and coordinated than conglomerates, 
while being less centralized than their typical multidivisional counterparts (Granovetter, 
1995). Thus, in this study, we define business groups as networks of loosely coupled 
legally independent firms, linked by persistent formal and informal ties.   
The network ties that connect group affiliates range from informal ties based on 
family, friendship, religion, language, and ethnicity (Khanna and Rivkin, 2006) to formal 
economic arrangements such as equity cross-holdings, direct interlocks, and 
buyer-supplier agreements (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian, 1996). In this study, we 
consider all three types of intra-group ties commonly found among group-affiliated firms: 
(1) buyer-supplier ties, when affiliates within a group engage in buyer-supplier relations. 
(2) equity ties, when affiliates own equity stakes in each other through cross- 
shareholdings, and (3) director ties, when an individual sits on the board of multiple 
affiliates. We then specify our expected contingency relationship, highlighting how these 
different types of ties imply different tie content and therefore different effects on 
capability acquisition.   
   8
HYPOTHESES 
 
Focal affiliates interested in developing superior R&D capability have the 
opportunity to access new ideas and resources possessed by other affiliates and then 
incorporate them into projects related to R&D capability building. Intra-group network 
ties represent an important vehicle for this process for a number of reasons.    First, 
buyer-supplier ties the focal affiliate maintains can promote its R&D capability by 
providing information advantages and facilitating resource-sharing. Buyer-supplier ties 
may serve as information conduits through which news of customers’ needs, new 
solutions to problems, or breakthroughs achieved by rivals travels from one affiliate to 
another. Studies have shown that buyer-supplier ties allow firms to take advantage of 
ideas from customers (von Hippel, 1988) or suppliers (Teece, 1989; Cusumano and 
Takeshi, 1991). Moreover, being in the same supply chain, the buyer or the supplier may 
have opportunities to leverage partner’s complementary resources (Shan, Walker, and 
Kogut, 1994; Koza and Lewin, 1998). Suppliers may even get involved in customers’ 
new product development process by taking advantage of their technological know-how 
and managerial expertise (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).
1 
Second, access to equity ties provides group affiliates with financial support for 
the improvement of R&D capability through continuous investment in updating and 
refreshing organizational skills, routines and systems. Moreover, to the extent that equity 
ties help firms insulate themselves from the pressures of short-term profit volatility, 
managers may be more willing to engage in activities which are beneficial to the 
long-term development, such as improving R&D capability. Equity ties among affiliates 
may also promote R&D capability by improving the functioning of an internal capital 
market and provide a mechanism for nurturing new ventures (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).   
Despite of its benefits, equity ties may exert potential negative effects by 
                                                 
1  Some have suggested that buyer-supplier ties can also constrain the development of capabilities by 
making affiliates entrenched in the intra-group relationships and insulated from advances and 
improvements beyond the group ((Nelson and Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Group firms 
may also force members to buy from other group members at prices and quality that are inferior to market 
terms. Indeed, early research on networks often identified constraints that networks impose on their 
members (Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian, 1996).   
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insulating less capable group members from acquisitions, and thus reducing their 
incentives to enhance their capabilities. In addition, majority shareholders such as the 
controlling family may use cross shareholding to extract financial resources from 
minority shareholders, which may interfere with the capability building of group 
affiliates.   
Third, director interlocks may assist R&D capability building by enhancing 
information flow. Useem’s (1984) work on the inner-circle of well-connected directors in 
the U.S. and Britain emphasizes that interlocks facilitate environmental scanning. 
Evidence from developing economies suggests that director interlocks sometimes assist 
performance by providing information that is not generally available in the market 
(Keister, 1998). Conversely, though, the acquisition of R&D capability might suffer 
when directors hold positions in multiple companies. Information overload may inhibit 
their ability to share useful information and coordinate business operations timely.   
While the discussion above suggests that intra-group network ties of any of the three 
types could positively or negatively affect the development of R&D capability of group 
affiliates, we see the pooled critical resources and the efficient internal intermediation 
provided by business groups as perhaps the cornerstone of the development of R&D 
capability. Emerging economies typically suffer from relatively weak institutions for 
arms-length relationships to facilitate the exchange of information and resources, and 
affiliates often lack resources for external acquisitions of capabilities.    Given the 
presence of an underdeveloped infrastructure for innovative activities in emerging 
economies and the need for access to flows of ideas and resources for R&D capability, 
one might expect a generally positive relationship between network ties and R&D 
capability acquisition. However, we believe that this overall relationship will mask 
significant differences based on the type of tie (and the content implied by that tie), and 
we develop this contingency argument immediately below.   
  We begin by noting work in the technology literature that suggests that the 
buyer-supplier ties that a focal affiliate maintains may be of greatest importance for the 
development of its R&D capability. To improve R&D capability requires access to a 
constant flow of ideas that can be recombined to create new ideas (Schumpeter, 1934; 
Fleming, 2001). The recent development of new economic growth theory similarly   10
emphasizes how knowledge spillovers across firms inspire further innovation (Romer, 
1990). To the extent that buyer-supplier ties act as conduits for flows of ideas and 
resources between affiliates within the group, they may greatly promote the enhancement 
of affiliates’ R&D capability. 
Furthermore, buyer-supplier ties may also facilitate the absorption, utilization, and 
exploitation of externally acquired resources, which are critical to the enhancement of 
innovativeness (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Compared to equity ties, firms involved in 
buyer-supplier ties are more closely related to each other in the sense that they have more 
opportunities to engage in specific research projects and solve problems jointly (Heide 
and Miner, 1992). The more they work together, the more they are likely to 
communication, interplay, and thus understand each other better. In this process, they 
may develop a set of shared routines of behavior and rules of exchange that greatly 
reduce opportunism and share resources more efficiently. The improved mutual trust not 
only guarantees the quality and validity of resources and ideas provided to each other, but 
also promotes a freer and more fine-grained exchange of ideas and resources (Uzzi, 1997), 
and thus make it easier for the firms to incorporate them into R&D capability building. 
Connected firms may also be better able to transfer and learn about situation-specific 
knowledge by developing relationship-specific heuristics (Hansen, 1999). Therefore, 
buyer-supplier ties may be more important than the other two types of ties to the 
acquisition of R&D capability. 
Another indispensable condition of successful R&D capability building is 
sufficient capital to support trial and error in innovative activities. Equity ties among 
group affiliates provide access to internal capital markets and credibility, making it easier 
for an affiliate to access complementary resources from other affiliates. They are of 
particular importance in the context of emerging economies where there are scant capital 
resources available beyond business groups.   
Relative to buyer-supplier ties and equity ties, director ties are likely to be less 
important to the development of R&D capability because there are alternative accesses to 
the benefits provided by such ties.    For instance, while family interlocking directorates 
can promote internal coordination through family authority relationships (Hamilton, 1997; 
Chung, 2003), when interlocking arises from a central family's desire to control multiple   11
companies, interlocking may lead to crony capitalism, i.e., where a small number of 
people, often family members or friends, sit on the boards of multiple affiliates with little 
consideration about the board members’ governance capability (Morck and Yeung, 2004). 
Such crony capitalism inhibits capability building because top managers focus on 
reinforcing family control and maximizing family objectives such as rent seeking rather 
than developing new goods and services that would require outside professionals who 
might dilute family control (Morck and Yeung, 2004).    Given the heterogeneity in the 
content of intra-group network ties across these three types of ties, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:    The effect of network ties between a focal affiliate and other group 
members on an affiliate’s R&D capability will be contingent on the type of tie:    The 
strongest positive effect will be for buyer-supplier ties, followed by equity ties, and 
then director ties.   
   
Hypothesis 1 captures our contingent perspective on how the differential content of 
network ties (i.e., alternative types of ties) will have a predictably differential effect on 
firm capability.  The basis for this contingent perspective, as presented above, is rooted 
in differences in the underlying mechanisms by which each type of tie could enhance 
R&D capability.  Before proceeding with the testing of this hypothesis, however, we 
would like to extend our reasoning to consider more deeply how the specific mechanisms 
we posit are at work.    To do this, we propose several additional hypotheses that focus on 
our  proposed  mechanisms  more  precisely.    
For example, recall that the underlying mechanism by which buyer-supplier ties are 
supposed to benefit R&D capability is by providing focal firms with access to valuable 
information. We can theorize further that not all buyer-supplier ties have equally valuable 
information.  Specifically, information is typically more valuable if it is non-redundant 
(Burt, 1992; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Two direct contacts are redundant if an indirect 
tie exists between them (Hansen, 1999). In contrast, if the two contacts are not connected 
with each other, they are likely to provide diverse and novel information from their own 
distinct sources (Burt, 1992). Therefore, the characteristics of the focal firm’s network 
structure may influence the non-redundancy of information. Specifically, focal firms   12
bridging structural holes are likely to benefit more from buyer-supplier ties by accessing 
non-redundant information from remote or unique parts of the network.   
 
Hypothesis 2:    A firm’s network structure (ego network) is likely to moderate the 
effects of buyer-supplier ties on R&D capability; specifically, the richer the structural 
holes, the higher the benefits of buyer-supplier ties on R&D capability.   
 
Information can also be more valuable if it is boundary-spanning. Prior research has 
indicated that the transfer of information and knowledge across boundaries, such as 
organizational, social, and institutional boundaries, improves firm performance (Epple, 
Argote and Devadas, 1991; Stuart and Podolny, 1996).To the extent that truly novel ideas 
often come from areas quite different from a firm’s own area of operation (Burt, 2004), 
the information benefits of buyer-supplier ties are likely to be higher when the focal 
firm’s partners operate in a diverse set of industries. Moreover, being exposed to various 
pools of information and knowledge through its partners operating in different industries, 
the focal firm is more capable of understanding tacit, complex information and ideas 
from distinct industries (Tsai, 2001; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). Taking advantage of 
efficient knowledge transfer and high absorptive capacity, the focal firm with partners in 
different industries tends to be more innovative by better recognizing, assimilating, and 
exploiting novel ideas and information conveyed through buyer-supplier ties. Thus, we 
propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3:    Diversity in one’s partners’ industries (alter-diversity) is likely to 
moderate the effects of buyer-supplier ties on R&D capability; specifically, the 
greater a firm’s alter-diversity in industry, the higher the benefits of buyer-supplier 
ties on R&D capability.   
    
To recap, the inclusion of H2 and H3, which address the possibility that some ties 
have higher versus lower information value, provides us with additional and more direct 
tests of the mechanisms invoked in our theoretical arguments for H1.    In other words, 
with H2 and H3, we are establishing a second-order contingency for H1. Before testing 
these hypothesized contingencies, we can complete our contingency perspective by 
taking this approach even further by positing how the information-value arguments   13
underlying H2 and H3 would apply differentially to buyer-supplier ties, relative to equity 
ties and director ties.    More specifically, our earlier theorizing regarding the content of 
ties suggested that information is the key resource of buyer-supplier ties (hence our focus 
on buyer-supplier ties in H2 and H3).    We also theorized that finances are the key 
resource component of equity ties, and that authority is the key resource component of 
director ties.    Therefore, it follows that our arguments of the contingencies regarding 
information value (H2 and H3) should be most applicable for buyer-supplier ties, relative 
to the other types of ties.    This suggests the following final hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 4:    The hypothesized relationships in H2 and H3 regarding information 
value will be more strongly positive for buyer-supplier ties than for equity or director 
ties.   
 
  In summary, we have argued that network ties will have specific benefits for R&D 
capability. The relative benefits of network ties, however, are likely to vary depending on 
the type of content which flows through these ties.    Hypothesis 1 provides an original,   
first-order contingency addressing the differential effects of three of types of network ties, 
and Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 offer original, second-order contingencies that address one of 
the underlying mechanisms assumed to be responsible for the differential effects (i.e., 




Our empirical analyses involve two steps. First, we estimate firm R&D capability 
using the stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) methodology. This approach views 
capabilities as an “intermediate transformation ability” that allows a firm to convert 
inputs available to the firm (i.e. its resources) into desired outputs (i.e. its objectives).
2 
                                                 
2  Because capabilities reside at the operational level inside the firms, we recognize that aggregate 
firm-level measures mask some of the important sources of within-firms variance. An alternative is to rely 
on project-level data to measure capability at a more micro-level (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Ethiraj, 
et al., 2005). However, the difficulty in obtaining detail project level data limits the applicability of this 
approach to a single industry, or sometimes a single firm. More recently, capabilities are conceived as the   14
SFE enables us to empirically estimate the efficient frontier (i.e. desired goal) and thus 
the level of productive efficiency (i.e. firm’s capability) achieved by each firm in the 
study. We expect that firms efficient in deploying its resources (i.e. network resource) 
have superior capabilities than those less efficient competitors. Second, we explore the 
impact of the content of intra-group network ties on the acquisition of R&D capability.   
 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
In contrast to conventional least squares-based regression techniques where all 
firms are assumed to operate on the efficient frontier and departures from the efficient 
frontier are attributed exclusively to random statistical noise (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000), SFE allows not only for the inherent randomness in production, but also for the 
firm-specific inefficiency in production, which provides a potential source of inter-firm 
variation in capabilities.   
Specifically, the SFE model is specified as   
it it it it u v ) , X ( f Y − + = β     [ 1 ]  
where  it Y denotes the appropriate function (e.g. logarithm) of the output for the ith 
sample firm in the tth time period, i= 1, 2, …, N, and t = 1, 2, …, T;  it X  represents  the 
vector of appropriate functions of inputs of firm i in time period t;  β   is the vector of 
unknown coefficients to be estimated. In Equation [1], we implicitly assume that firms 
are identical in terms of their expected capabilities given the same level of inputs because 
they share the same level of expected inefficiency error term u. However, it is likely to be 
violated due to the unobserved heterogeneity in firms’ capabilities. The model parameters 
β   are also assumed to be the same across all the firms. This too is a restrictive 
assumption in the sense that the impact of the same inputs on the outputs may be different 
due to the nature of their product lines. Since the failure to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity may lead to inconsistent parameter estimates, we apply a random parameter 
                                                                                                                                                 
efficiency with which a firm employs a given set of resources (inputs) to achieve whatever goals (outputs) 
it want to accomplish. Following this perspective, capabilities are “intermediate transformation ability” 
between resources (such as, R&D expenditure) and objectives (such as, developing innovative technologies) 
(Dutta, et. al., 2005).   
   15
stochastic frontier model which accounts for heterogeneity in both the inefficiency term 
and the coefficients of the inputs affecting the frontier.
3 
The consistent maximum likelihood estimates of all parameters in Equation [1]
4 
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and  (.) Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Based on the 
parameter estimates, we calculate the R&D capability for firm i in year t by estimating 
the efficiency via {} it it | ) u exp( E ε − , β ε it it it X Y − = ,  i= 1, 2, …, N, and t = 1, 2, …, T. The 
specific models used to measure R&D capability are discussed in Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2.   
 
Final Model   
Armed with the measure of R&D capability, we now examine how an affiliate’s 
R&D capability is driven by the three types of intra-group network ties. Formally, the 
model we estimate is the following: 
                                                 
3  Specifically, we assume thatβ   is randomly distributed over the population as ) , (
2
β δ β N . Since the mean 
of  β   is a function of firm-specific variables, we have i i i z z E Δ + = β β ] | [ , where  i z  denotes 
firm-specific variables for firmi . Moreover, we capture unobserved heterogeneity across firms in their 
capabilities by positing that the parameter  μ is a function of  i z as well. That is  ) , (
2
uit it it N u δ μ
+ =  
where it i it z ′ = δ μ .  
4  ) , ( β it X f in Equation [1] represents an idealized efficient frontier common to all sample firms and it 
defines the maximum level of expected output in the absence of uncertainty, given that firm i deploys 
it X  
level of inputs efficiently. The it v denotes the intrinsic randomness affecting output in a typical regression, 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed as ) , 0 (
2
v N δ . The  it u denotes the firm specific 
inefficiency making the realized output fall short of the efficient frontier, assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed as  ) , (
2
u N δ μ
+ with 0 > μ .   16
Affiliate R&D capability it = ( f Buyer-supplier ties, equity ties, director ties, Controls) + it ε    [3] 
We estimate model [3] using OLS. As a robustness check, we control for within-group 
serial-correlations and heteroskedasticity by using random effects generalized least 
square (GLS) models.   
 
DATA AND MEASURES   
 
While Taiwan is famous for its small and medium sized enterprises, groups are 
important players in the country (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Hamilton and Kao, 1990). 
The importance of group sales of top-100 groups as a percentage of GDP increased from 
28% in 1981 to 54% in 1998 (Chung and Mahmood, 2004). Business groups in Taiwan 
demonstrate a rich variety of network ties as well as variation in innovativeness within 
and across the groups.   
Affiliates of Taiwanese groups are linked together by economic and social ties 
including buyer-supplier relations, equity holdings, and director interlocks (Numazaki, 
1986). Affiliate firms of Taiwanese groups commonly engage in buyer-supplier 
relationships with each other in order to take advantages of economies of scale and scope. 
Taiwanese business groups commonly set up chains of equity shareholding ties among 
their member firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang, 2000), which allow information access and control over selecting key 
personnel such as boards of directors and CEOs in affiliate firms. Taiwanese groups 
typically hire professional managers to oversee routine administration of affiliates 
(Chung, 2001), while exercising strategic control through interlocking directorates of 
family members who often hold the position of board chairs of the affiliates. These 
intertwined interlocking-directorate ties provide a channel for the group to coordinate key 
business matters such as goal setting, strategic planning, resource allocation, institution 
building, and personnel selection (Chen, 2001). 
Taiwan also offers clear definitions of group membership. Group boundaries are 
ambiguous in some countries, implying that it is difficult to examine the effects of 
intra-group ties on affiliates’ innovative activity. In Japan, for instance, a lack of family 
solidarity and governmental encouragement of inter-group activities obscures keiretsu   17
boundaries (Saxonhouse, 1993; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995). In Taiwan, by contrast, 
strong cultural foundations such as patrilineal family connections and regional kinship 
delineate group boundaries clearly (Numazaki, 1986). One can identify the largest private 
owners and directors of group affiliates in Taiwan, along with detailed data on 
buyer-supplier, director, and equity ties. It is the heterogeneity of ties, coupled with the 
clarity of group boundary which makes groups in Taiwan attractive for examining how 
the content of intra-group ties affects capability acquisition. 
 
Data Source and Sample 
Our conceptual framework offers a contingency model that specifies how differences in 
the content of network ties will differentially affect the process of capability acquisition. 
To test this, we needed data on a firm’s network ties and its capabilities. There are three 
sources that we refer to. Our major data source is the Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT) 
directory, compiled by the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. The 
directory Business Groups in Taiwan is compiled by China Credit Information Service in 
Taipei (CCIS), the oldest and most prestigious credit-checking agency in Taiwan and an 
affiliate of Standard & Poor of the United States. CCIS started publishing data for the top 
100 business groups (in terms of annual sales) biennially in 1972. For credit checking in 
the private sector, CCIS maintains a database containing more than 30,000 largest firms 
in Taiwan. It constructs the database of business groups by examining the 
inter-organizational relationships such as shared identity, cross-shareholding and 
interlocking directorate among these firms. In addition to self-identification, firms have 
to meet the following objective criteria to be considered as member firms, including 
having overlaps of shareholders, directors, auditors, or decision-makers with the core 
firm and having substantial proportion of shares held by other group members. BGT 
defines a business group as “coherent business organization including several 
independent firms.” Since its second edition (which was published in 1974), BGT has 
consistently maintained the following criteria in selection of business groups: (1) more 
than 51 percent of the ownership was native capital; (2) the group had three or more 
independent firms, (3) the group had more than NT$100 million group total sales, and (4)   18
the core firm of the group was registered in Taiwan.
5  This directory is the most 
comprehensive and reliable source for business groups in Taiwan. According to BGT, the 
top 100 groups contributed 42% of national GDP in the 1990s, representing material 
business activity within Taiwan. Several previous studies rely on this source (Claessens 
et al., 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), although none has translated and coded the 
intra-group ties data. A unique feature of the BGT directories is that the volumes include 
figures for each group that depict intra-group buyer-supplier relationships, shared 
directorships, and equity cross-holdings. We used these figures to code buyer-supplier, 
director, and equity ties between affiliates. Moreover, the BGT directory provides detail 
information both about the groups and their affiliates. When coding the data, we 
identified the groups and their affiliates, and manually transcribed financial information 
about each group and each affiliate. 
Our focal firms are group affiliates that are listed on Taiwan Stock Market. To 
measure firms’ R&D capability, for each focal firm in our sample, we collected 
information pertaining to its R&D expenditure from the Taiwan Economic Journal Data 
Bank
6 ( http://www.tej.com.tw), and the number of successful patent applications of each 
firm from an online database of the Intellectual Property Office of Taiwanese government 
(http://www.patent.org.tw), which provides the information about patent applications of 
Taiwan firms since 1990. Our sample consisted of 101 observations for 61 listed firms 
belonging to 48 business groups for the years of 1990, 1994, and 1998. We chose to use 
the four-year window to allow sufficient variance in the focal firm’s network structure 
over different periods.   
 
Dependent Variable ---Affiliate R&D Capability 
Affiliate-level R&D capability is calculated in the way consistent with Dutta, 
Narasimhan, and Singh (1999). The details of measuring R&D capability are exhibited in 
Appendix 1
7  and Appendix 2.   
                                                 
5  The criterion (3) changed over the years as groups become bigger. 
6  This database provides verified, consistent, and timely data about Taiwan listed companies. 
7  The results in Appendix 2 are consistent with our expectations. For example, based on the magnitude of 
the coefficients, TECHBASE is a more important input than CUM_R&DEXPENSE (0.550 vs. 0.195). 
Moreover, there is significant unobserved heterogeneity in both TECHBASE (0.021, p<0.01) and 
CUM_R&DEXPENSE (0.013, p<0.05).     19
Independent Variables and Controls 
For each group, we use information on the number of intra-group buyer-supplier 
ties, equity ties, and director ties to measure network centrality. The Centrality measure 
uses degree centrality, which gauges the number of direct partners with which a focal 
affiliate has relationships. We did not use other centrality measures, such as closeness 
centrality and betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977), due to the small size of our 
networks. We created four degree-centrality measures, one for each type of tie 
(buyer-supplier, equity, and director centrality) and one for the sum of equity tie and 
director tie (equity-director centrality).  
We included three affiliate-level variables to capture other influences exerted by 
affiliates on the acquisition of capability. Affiliate Size denotes the total assets of the 
affiliate (thousands of New Taiwanese dollars). Large affiliates may be better positioned 
to acquire capabilities. Scale economies, in terms of spreading costs of implementing 
capabilities over a large base of operations, are greater in larger affiliates. Affiliate age 
refer to the number of years from the establishment of the firm. Older affiliates may be 
less innovative due to organizational inertia. Affiliate ROA denotes the annual affiliate 
return on assets. Affiliates with higher ROA are likely to be equipped with superior 
internal capabilities already, making it easier to develop new capabilities. Moreover, 19 
industry categories of affiliates are included to control for variations in competitive 
capabilities in distinct industries. 
   To  the  extent  that  firms  within  a group may share certain common group specific 
attributes, error terms across affiliates within a group may correlate with each other. Thus, 
a failure to control for group specific heterogeneities might lead to problems of 
autocorrelations among affiliates within the same group. We address this problem by 
including three group-level variables that address group level influences on the 
development of affiliate capability. Group Size records total group assets (in thousands 
New Taiwanese dollars). Group ROA refers to the annual group return on assets. We also 
control for the connectivity between affiliates using group network density of the three 
types of ties. Specifically, buyer-supplier density is defined as the ratio of actual 
buyer-supplier ties among affiliates within a business group to the total number of 
potential buyer-supplier ties in that group. Equity density is defined as the ratio of actual   20
equity ties among affiliates within a business group to the total number of potential equity 
ties in that group. Director density is defined as the ratio of actual director ties among 
affiliates within a business group to the total number of potential director ties in that 
group. In addition, we control for the main effects of three moderators involved in 
Hypothesis 2 to Hypothesis 4. Structural hole of buyer-supplier network is measured as 
the ratio of nonredundant partners to total partners in the ith affiliate’s buyer-supplier 
network. Structural hole of equity and director network is defined as the ratio of 
nonredundant partners to total partners in the ith affiliate’s equity network and director 
network. Alter diversity in industry is measured in an entropy-based index, 
- ), (ln i i P P ∑ for i =1 to 19, where i P   is the proportion of partners in the buyer-supplier 





Table 1A and Table 1B report summary statistics and correlations between 
variables. Table 1A shows significant heterogeneity in R&D capability across firms, with 
the minimum R&D capability at 0.814 and maximum R&D capability at 0.976. It also 
shows that the mean centrality across affiliates is highest for equity centrality (0.546), 
followed by director centrality (0.396) and buyer-supplier centrality (0.241). The rank 
ordering of mean density is director density first (0.339), followed by equity density 
(0.246) and buyer-supplier density (0.126).   
 
**** Table 1A and Table 1B about here ***** 
 
Regression results 
Table 2a provides regression results on affiliates’ R&D capability using the 
random effects models for panel data using the Weighted Generalized Least Squares 
(WGLS) estimation. We applied the Lagrange Multiplier test for unobserved 
heterogeneity to justify the use of panel estimation, and we applied the Hausman test 
(which ascertains the validity for using a random effects specification) to ensure that our   21
choice of model was justifiable (random effects models are less costly relative to fixed 
effects models in terms of degrees of freedom). We also cluster by groups to address the 
possibility that affiliates share group-specific attributes.   
 
**** Table 2a about here ***** 
 
Model 1 tested the effect of three types of network ties on the development of 
R&D capability. It shows that both buyer-supplier centrality and equity centrality (but not 
director centrality) lead to significant increases in R&D capability.  This  result  suggests 
that network ties can clearly affect firm capability, but also that the content of the tie 
matters, as hypothesized.    Regarding the relative magnitude of impacts of three types of 
ties on R&D capability, as predicted, buyer-supplier ties is highest (0.028) and followed 
by equity ties (0.016) and director ties (-0.003). To test our relative magnitude prediction 
more precisely, we conducted a Wald test to examine the equality of coefficients of the 
three types of ties. The results indicate that, as predicted by our H1, the effect of 
buyer-supplier ties is significantly greater than that of director ties (P<0.01). However, 
neither the difference between the coefficients of buyer-supplier ties and equity ties nor 
the difference between the coefficients of equity ties and director ties is significant. 
Therefore, H1, which proposes differential effects of different types of ties on capability 
building, is partially supported.   
Model 2 tests Hypothesis 2, which is one of our second-order contingency 
hypotheses.    It proposes a positive moderating effect of structural hole on the 
relationship between buyer-supplier centrality and development of R&D capability. 
Consistent with H2, we find that buyer-supplier ties are more valuable when the 
buyer-supplier network is rich in structural holes (P<0.01). In addition, Model 3 shows 
that alter diversity in industry also appreciates the value of buyer-supplier ties (P<0.01), 
supporting Hypothesis 3.   
Recall that H4 posited our final second-order contingency, stating that the 
hypothesized relationships in H2 (structural holes) and H3 (alter diversity) regarding 
information value should be more strongly positive for buyer-supplier ties than for equity 
or director ties. We use Models 4 and 5 to test the two components of this hypothesis.     22
Model 4 examines the relative impacts of structural holes in the network of specific type 
of ties on R&D capability building. It shows that structural holes in buyer-supplier 
network significantly increases the value of buyer-supplier ties, while structural holes in 
the network of equity ties and director ties do not. To compare their relative impacts, we 
adopt the Wald test, and the result indicates that the moderating effect of structural holes 
on buyer-supplier ties is significantly greater than on the other two types of ties, 
consistent with H4.    Model 5 tests the moderating effect of alter diversity in industry on 
different types of ties. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient of interaction term 
between buyer-supplier centrality and alter diversity in industry is positive and significant 
at 1% level, and there is no moderating effect of alter diversity in industry on the other 
two types of ties. The result of Wald test shows that alter diversity in industry imposes 
significantly greater moderating effect on buyer-supplier ties relative to equity ties and 
director ties. Thus, the results in Model 4 and Model 5 offer strong support for H4.   
 
Robustness checks for endogeneity   
  We recognize the possibility that innovative affiliates can position themselves more 
centrally in the networks in which they are embedded, since other affiliates might be keen 
to build relationships with the capable affiliate
8. We have addressed the issue of causality 
in three ways. First, we identified two specific contingencies where the informational 
value of buyer-supplier ties is likely to be stronger (H2 and H3). By scrutinizing the 
underlying theoretical channels by which buyer-supplier ties affect R&D capability, we 
provide a stronger case for causality (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Second, we use the 
instrumental variable approach (Table 2b) to check if there is serious endogeneity 
problem. The results were similar to Table 2a, suggesting that affiliates’ R&D capability 
is not associated with the change of their network positions. Third, we ran a set of 
regressions using the change of affiliate centrality between period t and t+1 as dependent 
variable, and R&D capability in period t as independent variable. The regression results 
show that none of the coefficients of R&D capability in the models is significant. Thus, 
while a central network position would contribute to the improvement of an affiliate’s 
                                                 
8  Prior studies have handled this causality issue by comparing the emergence of capabilities of interest to 
the duration of network ties between organizations and observed that the network ties came about much 
earlier than the emergence of capabilities (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; McEvily and Marcus, 2005).     23
R&D capability, an affiliate is not likely to become central simply because of its superior 
R&D capability. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
We began by noting that the study of firm capabilities and their acquisition and 
transfer has emerged as a central issue in the strategic management literature, and that 
while recent research has begun to establish the role of network ties in capability 
acquisition, there have been some contradictory findings.    We proposed that one way to 
advance this research agenda is to eschew the traditional view of network ties as generic 
conduits for information and resource exchange between firms, and to instead consider 
how different types of ties offer different tie content, and to consider further how this 
difference in content can more accurately explain the extent to which a firm can acquire 
capabilities through network ties. 
    We conceptualized and tested this perspective in the context of business groups 
in Taiwan, and we showed how differences in the content of group affiliates’ ties in 
business groups related to the development of their internal capabilities. Specifically, we 
argued that given the ability of buyer-supplier ties to provide stimuli for innovation, we 
predicted and found that affiliate firms in business groups with buyer-supplier ties were 
better able to acquire R&D capabilities than those without such ties.    We predicted and 
found that other types of ties (e.g., equity and director ties) were less valuable in R&D 
capability acquisition.    We also found support for other hypotheses that addressed how 
the informational value of buyer-supplier ties was itself contingent on other network 
characteristics of the tie (ego network and alter diversity).    Support for these 
second-order contingency hypotheses that address differences in the information value of 
certain ties gives us greater confidence in our focus on the likely content differences 
within different types of ties.    In addition, these additional hypotheses allow us to 
establish how R&D capability is a function of both the structure and the content of 
network ties. 
By offering a theoretical and empirical analysis of how different types of 
intra-group ties influence the acquisition of firm capabilities, we see our integrative study   24
as having implications for three separate streams of prior research: research on firm 
capabilities, social networks, and business groups.    With respect to research on firm 
capabilities, we see this study as deepening our understanding of the fundamental 
question of the possible origin of capabilities (Ethiraj et. al, 2005). Extant literature on 
capabilities has typically emphasized capabilities as internally generated, with 
heterogeneity primarily arising from imperfections in factor markets (Barney, 1986), 
distinct organizational skills and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), causal ambiguity 
and uncertain imitability (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), and deliberate investment in learning 
and making improvements (Zollo and Winter, 2002). While we do not deny internal 
sources of capability acquisition, we do challenge the implicit assumption that firms are 
autonomous and atomistic in their pursuit of capabilities. This atomistic approach, with 
its focus on the characteristics of firms, neglects the importance of the network in which 
firms are embedded (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Gulati, et al., 2000). Our research 
redresses this imbalance by highlighting the significance of network ties in the 
development of firm capabilities. It emphasizes the value of adding an embeddedness 
perspective when studying the acquisition of firm capabilities.   
We find it noteworthy that although there are numerous studies in the strategic 
management literature aimed at explaining variations in performance in terms of 
resources and capabilities, there are many fewer studies of how firms identify, develop 
and improve their capabilities. Our research extends this stream of research by 
highlighting the how and why some network ties (and not others) can serve as conduits 
for accessing external resources and capabilities. In other words, the heterogeneity in firm 
capabilities can be accounted for by not only differences in resources internal to the firm, 
but also variation in the content of a firm’s specific network ties. In essence, the content 
of network ties a firm maintains has a strong influence on its exposure to new ideas, 
opportunities, and resources, and therefore has important implications for its acquisition 
of  capabilities.   
Finally, we hope that our study has also contributed to the capabilities literature 
from a measurement perspective, based on our novel application of the stochastic frontier 
estimation (SFE) to measure R&D capability.    The measurement of capabilities has long 
been a contentious issue in the literature, but we see some important advantages in our   25
method, as discussed earlier.    Of course, others have suggested that “as far as limitations 
go, the most obvious one is the use of a parametric approach to estimating capabilities 
(Dutta et al., 2005).” One promising alternative that builds on our approach is to use 
semiparametric methods based on a combination of both Stochastic Frontier Estimation 
(SFE) and Data Envelope Analysis (DEA). 
  While our study is primarily focused on explaining differences in firm capabilities, 
we also hope to contribute to the large existing body of network research by providing a 
more discriminating understanding about the differential role that alternative types of ties 
in the acquisition of distinct capabilities. Extant network literature primarily focuses on 
the link between network structure and performance-related outcomes (Uzzi, 1996; Ahuja, 
2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). However, less attention has been paid to the impact of 
network ties on firm capabilities, which are an important source of competitive advantage 
(Nelson, 1991; Dosi, Nelson, and Winter, 2000). Moreover, most of the relevant studies 
treat all inter-organizational ties equally, without identifying the specific resources and 
information transmitted through distinct types of ties.  We have sought to provide 
specific and differentiated identification of the content implied by different types of ties. 
Our study provides support for the notion that the value of network ties is contingent on 
the interested outcome, the nature and content of ties, and the context being studied 
(Ahuja, 2000). 
We do so by our in-depth examination of the specific contingencies that affect the 
value of network ties.    We highlight how certain types of ties, such as buyer-supplier 
ties (as opposed to equity or director ties) have particular value in terms of tie content that 
would be particularly conducive to a firm’s acquisition of R&D capability (H1).    In 
addition, we provide second-order contingent hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4) and empirical 
tests to test the underlying mechanisms that provide the logic for the first main 
hypothesis.    
We also seek to contribute to research on business groups (particularly in 
emerging economies) by examining how group network ties shape the specific 
development of focal affiliates’ capabilities. We find that some group network ties 
provide benefits on affiliates’ capabilities, whereas some to not. Business groups can 
assist in the acquisition of capabilities in the sense that it facilitates resource-sharing and   26
information exchange among affiliates, which are hard to be achieved via market system 
in emerging economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). The focal affiliate’s configuration of 
linkages with other group members is an important vehicle through which the affiliate’s 
competences, routines, and concepts are continually updated and improved.   
We see our study as advancing our understanding of the relationship between 
networks and capabilities, and we propose several extensions for future research.  For 
example, we would welcome additional disaggregated measures of capability that go 
beyond functional domains and focuses on individual projects (Ethiraj et. al, 2005; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994).  Such indicators may be particularly useful for 
identifying the underlying process through which network structure benefits or constrains 
the acquisition of firm capabilities.   
Second, just as we have shown that network ties affect firm capabilities, others 
might study how superior capabilities can also influence the configuration of networks. In 
this study, as noted earlier, we carefully addressed the issue of causal direction in 
multiple ways.  Future research examining the potential simultaneous relationship 
between networks and capabilities may be a useful next step. Finally, while believe that 
our empirical context was well-suited for our study question, we would welcome 
extensions of our work using samples of business groups from other countries.  Given 
the growing importance of firm capabilities and network ties, we believe that additional 
research studies linking these two topics and extending our study in any of these 
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Tables and Figures 





 Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variables 
R&D capability  0.946  0.029  0.814  0.976 
Independent Variables       
Buyer-supplier centrality  0.241  0.277  0  1 
Equity centrality  0.546  0.362  0  1 
Director centrality  0.396  0.300  0  1 
Equity-director centrality  0.917  0.484  0  2 
Control Variables   
Buyer-supplier density  0.126  0.187  0  1 
Equity density  0.246  0.181  0  1 
Director density  0.339  0.273  0  1 
Affiliate assets  62797.240  114421.600  237.000  832674.000 
Affiliate age  28.030  11.410  1  80 
Affiliate return-on-asset  5.098  5.725  -13.300  45.560 
Group assets  85974.520  139161.000  1452.000  978455.000 
Group return-on-asset  5.069  5.547  -8.450  45.569 
Structural hole of buyer-supplier network  0.705  0.188  0.067  0.971 
Structural hole of equity-director network  0.578  0.184  0.067  0.935 
Alter diversity in industry  1.838  0.669  0  3.312   33 
 
Table 1B. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
1.R&D  capability  1.00                 
2.Buyer-supplier  centrality  0.06  1.00                
3.Equity  centrality  0.09  0.20*  1.00               
4.Director  centrality  -0.03  0.16*  0.14*  1.00              
5.Equity-director  centrality  0.05  0.24*  0.79*  0.72*  1.00             
6.Buyer-supplier density  -0.01  0.80*  0.03  0.15*  0.12*  1.00            
7.Equity density  -0.11  0.29*  0.44*  0.20*  0.43*  0.38*  1.00           
8.Director density  -0.04  0.18*  0.10  0.86*  0.60*  0.25*  0.27*  1.00          
9.Firm size  0.06  -0.06  0.04  -0.11*  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.08  1.00         
10.Firm age  -0.09  0.11*  0.19*  0.011  0.14*  -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 0.03  1.00            
11.Firm ROA  -0.08  0.13*  -0.05  0.12*  0.04  0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.04  -0.01  1.00          
12.Group size  0.20*  -0.43*  -0.30*  -0.27*  -0.37*  -0.41* -0.42* -0.28* 0.20* 0.04 -0.01 1.00        
13.Group ROA  0.08  0.14*  -0.06  0.09  0.01  0.091  0.051 0.02 -0.09  -0.11* 0.37* -0.14*  1.00      
14.Structural hole of buyer-supplier network  0.02  -0.47*  0.04  -0.22* -0.11* -0.70* -0.51* -0.33* 0.07 0.16* -0.02 0.36* -0.10  1.00    
15. Structural hole of equity-director  network  0.01 -0.28* -0.07 -0.62*  -0.43* -0.42* -0.57* -0.68*  0.10* 0.18* -0.09 0.35* -0.09 0.66* 1.00   
16. Alter diversity in industry  0.11  -0.42* -0.26* -0.22* -0.32* -0.49* -0.58* -0.27* 0.13* 0.23* -0.10* 0.64* -0.17* 0.54* 0.53* 1.00 
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Table 2a. The effect of intra-group network on group affiliates’ R&D capability using Random 
Effect GLS 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Independent variables         















(0.009)    





(0.013)    
Buyer-supplier centrality*Structural hole   0.007** 
(0.003)    0.006** 
(0.003)   
Buyer-supplier centrality*Alter diversity in industry      0.008*** 
(0.003)    0.007*** 
(0.003) 
Equity-director centrality*Structural hole       -0.001 
(0.004)   
Equity-director centrality* Alter diversity in industry        0.001 
(0.003) 
Control variables           










Structural hole of buyer-supplier ties   0.018 
(0.030)    0.012 
(0.032)   
Structural hole of equity and director    ties       0.016 
(0.031)   








































































R-square  56.06%  60.25% 62.87% 60.48%  61.91% 
Number of observations  101  101  101  101  101 
  
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
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Table 2b. The effect of intra-group network on group affiliates’ R&D capability using random 
effects instrumental variable model 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Independent variables          















(0.010)    





(0.014)    
Buyer-supplier centrality*Structural hole   0.007** 
(0.003)    0.008*** 
(0.003)   
Buyer-supplier centrality*Alter diversity in industry      0.011*** 
(0.003)    0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Equity-director centrality*Structural hole       -0.001 
(0.004)   
Equity-director centrality* Alter diversity in 
industry 
       0.001 
(0.003) 
Control variables           










Structural hole of buyer-supplier ties   0.020 
(0.032)    0.018 
(0.032)   
Structural hole of equity and director    ties       0.009 
(0.031)   








































































R-square 56.05%  60.20%  61.08%  60.56%  61.16% 
Wald chi2  87.42  103.77  111.94  118.70  127.85 
Number of observations  101  101  101  101  101 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
                    Dummy variables for industry are included in the models, but not shown in the table.   36
 
 
APPENDIX 1: MODELING R&D CAPABILITY 
 
We define a firm’s R&D capability as its ability to allocate resources to achieve the 
maximum level of technological output given a certain level of its deployed resources. Resources 
influential to the technological output (TECHOUTPUT) include technological base 
(TECHBASE), and accumulated R&D expenditure (CUM_R&DEXPENSE) (Dutta et al., 1999). 
Using Cobb-Douglas production function, we specify the innovation frontier as follows: 
 
it it it it u v ) DEXP & CUMR ln( * ) TECHBASE ln( * ) TECHOUTPUT ln( − + + + = 2 1 0 β β β    
 
We use the number of successful patent applications to measure a firm’s technological 
output (TECHOUTPUT).
9  We use local patents to measure firms’ innovative output. Meanwhile, 
U.S. patents are used for robustness check, which shows that the results are qualitatively the 
same. As R&D expenditures are likely to have a lagged impact on patent application, we use a 
two-year lag with respect to the dates of R&D expenditures. For robustness purpose, we 
experiment with concurrent and three-year lag structures. The results are very similar. 
 
Technological base (TECHBASE) is defined as the stock of technological output, with a lower 
weight on the technological output in earlier years than in later years. Specifically, technological 
base results from the estimation of a Koyck lag function on technological output. Technological 








− = δ , where t=1, 2…5 
periods. Here parameter  δ indicates the weight assigned to the technological output in previous 
years. The higher the value ofδ , the greater the spillover effect from past levels of technological 
output.  
 
Accumulated R&D expenditure (CUM_R&DEXPENSE) is defined as the stock of R&D 
expenditures, with lower weights on earlier R&D expenditures than on later R&D expenditures 









− = γ , where t=1, 2…5 periods. Here  γ  
is the weight assigned to R&D expenditures in previous periods. The higher the value ofγ , the 
greater the spillover effect from R&D expenditures in previous periods. We expect both 











                                                 
9 This measure treats all patents equally important. We recognize that a better approach would be to use 
quality-adjusted patent counts, which assign a weight to a firm’s patent based on the number of citations 
the patent has received (Dutta, et al, 1999). Due to the unavailability patent citation information for local 
patents, we use the raw patent counts as a measure of technological output.   37
 
 
APPENDIX 2: MEASURING R&D CAPABILITY 
 
Parameter Estimates of R&D Capability   
Random Parameters Stochastic Frontier Model 
Variables Population  Average  Effect 
Variance of Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
Component 










Composite Error Variance 
(
2 2 2




Variance of Inefficiency Error Term (
2
u δ )  1.052** 
(0.018) 
 
Log-likelihood Function  -2740.39***   
 
•  *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the 
parentheses. The likelihood ratio test is used to test the overall significance of the model. 